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Abstract

The relationship between immigration and welfare provision is at the heart of welfare politics research.
While prior studies have examined how immigration affects welfare generosity, less is known about the
consequences of exclusive welfare policies and immigration on social inequality. In this paper, by using
TANF as the policy context, we offer a systematic examination of how immigration, combined with
state immigrant welfare policies affect inequality in welfare usage between citizens and immigrants.
Using data across the fifty American states from 2001 to 2016, we find evidence that exclusive state
immigrant TANF policies are a key source of decreased immigrant TANF caseload rate and enlarged
citizen-immigrant TANF caseload gap. Moreover, states’ immigrant population density moderates the
effect of state immigrant welfare eligibility policies on immigrant TANF caseload rate and citizenimmigrant TANF caseload gap. Our robustness checks by using alternative measures of the dependent
variable and key independent variable verify these findings.
Key Words
Immigration, Immigrant TANF Eligibility, Policy Exclusion, Welfare Usage

The Trump administration’s punitive policies toward immigrants have brought discussions
of immigration and immigrant policy into the center stage of American politics. The previous
administration aimed to end birthright citizenship, vowed to make it harder for immigrants to enter
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the country, and limited immigrants’ access to government welfare programs, all of which has
created a harsher environment for immigrants in the US (Wagner, Dawsey, and Sonmez., 2018;
Shear and Sullivan, 2019). As an integral part of American society, immigrants’ participation in
public and political life is essential to American democracy. Immigration also plays an important role
in shaping the historical development of the American welfare system (Hero and Preuhs 2007; Fox
2012).
Previous research suggests that a hostile environment created by punitive immigrant policies
could make legal and eligible immigrants shy away or even withdraw from governmental programs,
causing a “chilling effect” (Fix and Passel, 1999; Haider et al., 2004; Haider et al., 2004; Lofstrom
and Bean, 2002; Pedraza et al. 2017; Van Hook, 2003). Research on legal immigration federalism and
exclusive anti-immigrant policies highlights how exclusive policies such as “self-deportation” and
“attrition through enforcement” can have negative spillover effects on legal immigrants by creating
social inequality in access to public services and welfare benefits (Ramakrishnan and Gulasekaram
2015; Rocha et al. 2014, 2015; Pedraza et al. 2017), by increasing perceived discrimination in legal
immigrant communities (Almeida et al. 2016) and decreasing ethnic minorities’ trust in government
(Nicoles et al. 2018). Amid the heightened hostility against immigrants during the Trump era, it is
important to explore the impact of punitive immigrant policies on social equity.
In this paper, we use Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), the major public
cash assistance program, as an example to examine the effects of exclusive immigrant policies on the
inequality of social safety net participation between immigrants and citizens. More specifically, we
explore how generous/exclusive state immigration policies may affect social disparities between
citizens and immigrants in the social safety net coverage. The wide variation in state-level immigrant
welfare policies provides a fruitful empirical context for us to study whether exclusive state
immigrant welfare policies cause declines in immigrants’ welfare usage and a wider citizen-immigrant
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gap in using this public program. Following the 1996 federal welfare reform, American states
adopted a wide range of policies on immigrant welfare provisions. While some states embraced
more progressive reforms to their public assistance programs, other states tightened welfare
eligibility rules which led to welfare exclusion of immigrants. The emergence of states’ antiimmigrant welfare policies reflects a long-standing history of immigrant exclusion from social
welfare (Fox 2012). As Fox (2012) points out, such exclusive policies create different assistance to
needy families based on racial identities and immigration status and raise normative questions over
how the American welfare system defines equal citizenship. Explorations of these questions will
help us understand the political and social implications of immigrant policymaking in the era of
rising populism and anti-immigrant sentiment.
Existing studies have explored how immigration, federalism, and states’ exclusive eligibility
rules might drive retrenchment in benefit generosity (Hero and Preuhs 2007). We contend that it is
important to unpack how these exclusive policies may also have distributional implications and
produce unequal access to public benefits. Behind tightened welfare eligibility rules are normative
concerns about equal citizenship and equal access. We extend the existing literature by arguing that
exclusive state immigrant policies lead to sharper decreases in TANF participation rates among
immigrants as well as a wider citizen-immigrant gap in welfare participation in these states because
of the chilling effects and negative social constructions among the immigrant population triggered
by such punitive policies.

Furthermore, we explore whether factors such as a larger immigrant population or rapid
growth in the foreign-born population could counter some of these negative effects. We argue that
the relationship between state immigrant policies and immigrants’ welfare participation is conditional
upon immigrant population density: the positive effect of exclusive immigrant TANF policy on the
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immigrant-citizen TANF gap is weakened in states with a growing immigrant population. This is
because a denser immigrant population can on the one hand provide important networks for
immigrants to gain information about welfare eligibility and alleviate negative social construction
about welfare participation, and on the other hand increases the descriptive representation power of
immigrant groups. By using a Cross-Section-Time-Series (CSTS) dataset of American states from
2001 to 2016, our analyses show strong support for our hypotheses, suggesting that both state
immigrant TANF policies and immigrant population context play a role in immigrants’ participation
in public welfare programs and immigrant-citizen TANF participation gap. We conduct a series of
robustness checks to make sure that our findings hold when we use alternative measurements for
our dependent variable and key independent variables.

POLICY DEVOLUTION AND THE WELFARE EXCLUSION OF IMMIGRANTS
In 1996, the federal government passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which barred most immigrants from major federal-funded welfare
programs in the first five years after they enter the United States. At the same time, the states were
given the discretion to provide immigrants welfare assistance at their own costs. Under the major
means-tested cash assistance program, TANF, states could make their own immigrants’ eligibility rules
in three areas: (1) whether to provide pre-enactment immigrants (i.e., immigrants who entered the U.S.
before the PRWORA reform) benefits; (2) whether to offer post-enactment immigrants (i.e.,
immigrants who arrived in the U.S. after the PRWORA reform) benefits during the five-year bar; and
(3) whether to give post-enactment immigrants benefits after the five-year bar set by the federal
government (Tumlin et al. 1999; Bilter and Hoynes 2013).
States have adopted quite different immigrant TANF policies, with some generously offering
state funds to provide immigrants cash assistance and others not providing any additional assistance.
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For example, right after the reform, states such as California, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois,
Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oregon, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming immediately decided to use state funds and provide TANF assistance to all three immigrant
scenarios mentioned above. On the other hand, states such as Mississippi and Montana refused to
provide any TANF assistance to immigrants in the above-mentioned three scenarios. States such as
Arkansas, Idaho, and Texas stood in between the two extremes: while agreeing to offer TANF
assistance to pre-enactment immigrants, they refused to provide assistance to post-enactment
immigrants either during or after their first five-year stay.
Situating our research in the broad literature on state immigrant policy and access to social
safety net programs, we focus on how progressive and conservative states differ in their policy
designs regarding the rights of legal and undocumented immigrants in the social welfare area.
Previous studies in immigration federalism define state immigrant policy (or alienage policy) as “laws
and rules that regulate the political, economic and social rights of noncitizens” (Filindra and
Goodman 2019, 502), for which states play important roles in making decisions regarding how
noncitizens are incorporated or excluded in the society. Empirical studies on states’ immigrant
policies and healthcare suggest inclusive immigrant policies in health care produce positive spillover
effects on immigrants’ take-up in other major safety net programs, while anti-immigrant policies
operate as a legal exclusion for undocumented immigrants and de facto exclusion for legal
immigrants (Colbern and Ramakishnan 2020). Scholars also find welcoming or restrictive alienage
policies produce far-reaching consequences on immigrants’ political attitudes and participation
behavior (Filiandra and Manataschal 2020).
In another body of literature, scholars argue that policy devolution (i.e. devolve core state
functions to lower jurisdiction) harm the interests of racial minorities and therefore amplify racial
disparities (Hook, 2003; Keiser, Mueser, & Choi, 2004; Soss et al., 2008; Soss et al., 2001). With local
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welfare control, areas with a high concentration of minorities almost always had the toughest welfare
eligibility rules historically, producing racial disparities (Lieberman, 1998; see also Soss et al., 2008).
The American welfare state has a long history of using local control to exclude racial minorities. For
example, policymakers of the State Mothers’ Pensions “used local control to focus aid on white
mothers and immigrants deemed capable of assimilation,” which resulted in excluded minorities
only receiving a very small portion of the benefits (Reese, 2005; Gordon, 1994; see also Soss et al.
2008, 550). In the 1980s, Congress restricted immigrants’ access to public assistance in the first three
years after their official settlement (Van Hook, 2003). In the 1990s, California “barred unauthorized
aliens from public education, non-emergency health benefits, and social services” with Proposition
187 (Van Hook, 2003, 615).
Exclusive state welfare policies not only create a legal and policy barrier in preventing
immigrants from participating in welfare programs but also cause a “chilling effect” on eligible
immigrants’ decisions of participation. These policies could send a signal of hosting states’ inhospitality
and as a result, immigrants could either be intimidated or confused about their eligibility and end up
not applying for certain public programs even if they are eligible (Fix and Passel 1999; Lofstrom and
Bean 2002). Hostile immigrant welfare policies could also make immigrants distrust the American
government and shy away from government-provided goods and services (Ellwood 2000; Bilter et al.
2005; Ku 2009). Condon, Filindra, and Wichowsky (2016) argue that punitive immigrant policies not
only directly affect targeted immigrants and deter them from participating in public programs, but also
have spill-over effects on second-generation immigrants and the whole ethnic community that
immigrants identify themselves with. Colbern and Ramkrishnan (2020) focus on punitive immigration
federalism and find that when states adopt exclusive immigrant eligibility rules in their social safety net
programs, these policies have substantial consequences in defining citizenship and rights of access. As
such, legal immigrants’ participation in public welfare programs is often encouraged by inclusive state
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policies and depressed by exclusive policies. The broader literature on immigration and social welfare
also suggests that exclusive immigrant policies such as punitive interior enforcement activities may
increase fear, perceived discrimination, and distrust in government (Almeida et al. 2016; Nicoles et al.
2018; Rocha et al. 2015).
Additionally, restrictive or punitive immigrant policies could create negative social construction
(i.e., stigma) that directly influence the targeted population’s behavior of welfare participation
(Schneider and Ingram, 1993). Yoo (2008) notes that congressional policy hearings leading to the 1996
welfare reform constructed immigrants as “undeserving”, “fraudulent”, “irresponsible”, “negligent”,
“noncontributing” and “burden to taxpayers.” Likewise, exclusive state policies could also create a
hostile policy environment for immigrants by associating them with negative social labels, such as
“being lazy,” “undeserving,” and “abusing welfare.” Through such stigmatization, exclusive state
policies could send negative signals to all immigrants and make them feel ashamed to participate in
these welfare programs. As Filindra et al. (2011, p.174) argue, inclusive immigrant policies “represent a
positive signal from the state that immigrants are to be accommodated and their needs respected.
Conversely, punitive policies operate as a negative signal to immigrants that their presence and their
cultural distinctiveness are not welcome.” Using survey data from several hundreds of community
health center patients, Stuber and Kronebusch (2004) find that states that enacted stricter welfare
reform policies have seen decreasing welfare participation because stigma associated with recipients
depressed recipients from taking up benefits from these programs.
Prior research suggests that legal eligible immigrants were more likely to withdraw from
governmental programs compared to citizens after exclusive or punitive immigrant policies were
issued. Numerous studies find that welfare caseloads and Medicaid participation rates
disproportionally drop among noncitizens after the welfare reform, suggesting that the law may have
created an anti-immigrant environment and caused a chilling effect among the immigrant community
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(Bell, 2001; Borjas, 2001; Fix and Passel, 1999, 2002; Bilter, Gelbach and Hoynes, 2005; DeLeire,
Levine and Levy, 2006). Fix and Passel (1999) find that welfare receipts for noncitizen households
declined by 35% between 1994 and 1997, but it only dropped by 14% among citizen households, and
similar patterns were found for TANF, SSI, food stamps, and Medicaid. Other research shows that
this chilling effect led to decreased participation rates among immigrants whose eligibility was not
affected by the welfare reform (Kandula, Grogan, Rathouz and Lauterdale, 2004; Kaushal and
Kaestner, 2005). Punitive immigrant policies may also impact children of immigrants who are citizens.
Watson (2014) finds robust evidence that immigration enforcement is negatively associated with
Medicaid participation among children of noncitizens, though these children themselves are citizens.
In a number of single-state studies, scholars find similar chilling effects of punitive state
immigrant welfare policies. Eligible immigrants in Texas withdrew from certain welfare programs due
to Texas’ exclusive immigrant welfare eligibility rules (Hagan et al., 2003). Approved applications for
Medi-Cal and TANF in Los Angeles County, California dropped by 71% among legal noncitizen
families but no reduction was observed among citizens between 1996 and 1998 (Zimmermann and
Fix, 1998). This chilling effect caused by the 1996 federal welfare reform happened even when “there
was no change in legal immigrants’ eligibility for these programs in California and denial rates in the
county remained steady during the period examined” (Zimmermann and Fix, 1998; see also Fix and
Passel, 1999, p.1).
Considering the legal barrier, chilling effect, and negative social construction caused by hostile
immigrant welfare policies, we argue that in states with more exclusive immigrant TANF policies,
immigrant participation in TANF programs will decrease not only because ineligible immigrants are
barred from TANF, but also because of the chilling effect on eligible immigrants. Consequently, the
citizen-immigrant TANF participation gap in these states will be greater. Therefore, we develop our
first set of hypotheses.
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H1-a: Exclusive immigrant TANF policies are negatively associated with immigrants’
TANF participation rates.
H1-b: Exclusive immigrant TANF policies are positively associated with the citizenimmigrant TANF participation gap.
IMMIGRANT NETWORK AND DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION POWER
State immigrant TANF policies could influence immigrants’ participation in TANF and
potentially enlarge the gap of citizen-immigrant participation in these programs. Yet, a larger or denser
immigrant population should condition this effect for two reasons: (1) immigrant network from a
denser population can facilitate new immigrants’ participation in welfare programs by providing more
information and alleviate negative social constructions; and (2) a larger immigrant population
represents more political power and social influence of immigrants in the state. The U.S. has
witnessed a new immigration wave since the 1970s and the foreign-born population has more than
quadrupled during this time period (U.S. Census Bureau 1999, 2007). Yet, the foreign-born
population is not evenly distributed among American states. Certain states such as California, New
York, New Jersey, Texas, Arizona, and Hawaii host a large immigrant population but states such as
West Virginia, Montana, North and South Dakota, Mississippi, Wyoming, and Maine only have less
than 2.5% foreign-born population.
Immigrant networks often proliferate in states with large and/or rapidly growing immigrant
populations. Immigrant networks that connect immigrants with each other play an important role in
immigrants’ welfare participation. As Van Hook points out, the welfare reform “increased the
complexity of immigrant welfare policy and may have confused immigrants about whether they are
eligible for benefits” (Van Hook 2003, p.616). In the post-reform period, immigrants’ eligibility for
TANF is influenced by a complex set of factors such as their length of stay, immigration status,
work history, and whether an immigrant entered the state before or after the 1996 welfare reform. In
addition, many states changed their immigrant eligibility rules for TANF more than once since the
9

1996 welfare reform, and states have different eligibility rules from one another. Therefore, it is a
highly challenging task for an immigrant individual to master the information and track changes of
such policy. Immigrants who have lived in the U.S. for a long time might not even be fully aware of
various welfare eligibility rules in their residing state. What has made the situation even worse is that
the information on immigrant TANF eligibility rules is rarely made public in any state. In a survey,
Capps and colleagues (2002) find that about 40% of immigrant families gave wrong answers to at
least two out of three questions about welfare eligibility rules and the impact of welfare receipt on
their legal status and future naturalization.
Considering the fact that immigrant TANF eligibility rules are complex and volatile, we
argue that the information spillovers through immigrants’ networking with other immigrants are
crucial for them to gain information and learn about how to participate in various welfare programs.
As Van Oorschot (1991) points out, “at the individual or client level the most important factor in
determining whether an individual will pursue a means-tested claim is information…usually the
largest part of non-take-up is directly caused by simply not being aware of a scheme’s existence,
followed, among these who are aware, by misperceptions of eligibility” (c.f. Ernst et al., 2013,
p.1290-1291).
Furthermore, welfare participation in means-tested programs is often stigmatized; especially
“if a staff member is accusatory and rude or, conversely, inviting, this may have an effect on the
potential client’s willingness to engage in benefit claiming” (Ernst et al. 2013, p.1290-1291).
Socializing with other immigrants, especially other immigrant welfare recipients will not only make
individuals more likely to obtain information about various welfare programs and whether or not
they are eligible to receive welfare benefits, but also make them less shameful of taking welfare
benefits. Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan (2000) find that immigrants with more contacts with
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other immigrants, especially immigrants with knowledge of welfare programs, are much more likely
to participate in welfare programs themselves.
A large or growing immigrant population also suggests more or increasing political power of
the minority groups, especially Latinos. For instance, Keiser et al. (2004, p.318) suggest that
increases in immigrant population lead to increases in Latino political power, which will not only
“increase the political power of community groups who act on behalf of minorities” but also make
elected officials “more likely to exert political influence on behalf of minorities” and bureaucracies
more likely “to hire more minorities as supervisors and caseworkers.” Previous research suggests
that in states with larger Latino populations, the racial backlash effect on welfare benefit levels can
be offset by the political representation of Latinos (Preuhs, 2007), and in these states, Latinos are
also more likely to participate in politics (Jeong 2013). Greater political influence through descriptive
representation will likely empower immigrants and offset the chilling effect and negative social
constructions from hostile political environments and unfriendly policies.
Based on this contention, we hypothesize that the effect of a state’s immigrant TANF policy
on immigrants’ welfare usage (either by itself or in comparison with citizens’ usage), is conditional
upon immigrant population density in that state because immigrant network from a denser
population can facilitate new immigrants’ participation in welfare programs by providing more
information and alleviate negative social constructions, and a larger immigrant population represents
more political power and social influence of immigrants in the state. Therefore, in states with a large
or growing immigrant population, the negative effect of restrictive immigrant TANF policy on
immigrant TANF participation will be weakened, and the positive effect of exclusive TANF policy
on the immigrant-citizen TANF gap will be also attenuated.
H2-a: The negative effect of exclusive immigrant TANF policy on immigrant TANF
usage should be weakened in states with a larger or growing immigrant population.

11

H2-b: The positive effect of exclusive immigrant TANF policy on the immigrantcitizen TANF gap should be weakened in states with a larger or growing immigrant
population.

RESEARCH DESIGN
To test our hypotheses, we build a cross-section-time-series (CSTS) dataset based on
American states from 2001 to 2016. We estimate immigrants’ TANF rates and citizen-immigrant
TANF gap as a function of immigrant TANF eligibility rule, immigrant population density, the
interaction of the two, as well as a full set of control variables. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller unitroot test and Phillips-Perron test show that our dependent variables, immigrant TANF caseload rate,
and citizen-immigrant TANF caseload gap, are both panel stationary. Following De Boef and
Keele’s (2008) suggestion, we start off with a general ECM specification coupled with several joint F
tests to determine if our models can be more parsimonious. Following these diagnostic analyses, our
empirical models include both lagged and first difference of the core independent variables, but only
the lagged terms of all control variables. Detailed data diagnosis process and alternative model
specification are included in the Supplementary Material.
We use the Panel-Corrected-Standard-Error procedure (PCSE) to correct cross-state
heterogeneity and contemporaneous correlation in the CSTS analysis (Beck and Katz 1996; Beck
2001). By analyzing standardized residuals after fitting a baseline OLS model, we detect Florida,
Hawaii, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, and Utah as outlier states and therefore control them with
dummy variables of these states. We report results based on the ECM specification, but also present
results from a static model and a full ECM model as robustness checks in the Supplementary
Material.
Dependent Variables
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Immigrant TANF Caseload Rate: We collect data on the total number of adult TANF
recipients and the percentage of adult citizen and non-citizen recipients from the Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS) Office of Family Assistance. We use the percentage of adult
citizen recipients out of the total number of recipients as the measure for citizen TANF caseload
rate, and the percentage of qualified immigrant adult recipients out of the total number of recipients
as the measure for immigrant TANF caseload rate.
We realize that household surveys such as the U.S. Census Bureau Current Population
Surveys (CPS) are widely used in research on poverty and welfare benefit use. However, welfare
take-up estimates by subgroups (such as immigrants or foreign-born population) based on the CPS
survey are particularly prone to measurement errors due to survey nonparticipation, nonresponses,
and misreporting.[1] Indeed, when we use CPS data to tabulate the percentage of foreign-born
individuals using cash assistance by states, we find that roughly one-third of the observations were 0.
In other words, for about one-third of the state-year cases, no foreign-born respondents indicated
using cash assistance in the past year. However, data that we collected from the DHHS
administrative records show that only 6% of the state-years reported 0 immigrant recipients. This
type of large measurement error in household survey data prevents us from making reliable
estimations of the relationships between our key variables. Therefore, after careful considerations of
the pros and cons, we decided to use the administrative records data from the DHHS as our
dependent variables in our main models, which provide more accurate information on the number
of TANF recipients and their citizenship status for each state year. However, we use the selfreported TANF participation data from CPS as a robustness check and the results are presented in
the robustness check section below. [2]
Citizen-Immigrant TANF Caseload Gap. To compare the difference in TANF usage between
citizens and immigrants, we use the citizen-immigrant TANF gap as our second dependent variable.
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This variable is measured by the difference of TANF caseload rates by adult citizens and noncitizens based on administrative records data from the DHHS. In a robustness check, we use the gap
between citizen and immigrant TANF participant rates based on the CPS data as the dependent
variable to verify our findings.
Independent Variables
Immigrant TANF Eligibility Score. Our key policy variable measures the level of inclusion of
immigrants into state TANF programs. Following Tumlin, Zimmermann, and Ost (1999), we draw
data from Urban Institute’s State Welfare Rules Database and examine the key aspects of immigrant
TANF eligibilities from 2001 to 2016. Specifically, we measure seven aspects of the policy: (1)
whether states cover pre-PRWORA immigrants in their TANF program; (2) whether states use their
own state funds to provide post-PRWORA immigrants TANF benefits during the five-year bar of
federal benefits; (3) whether states grant TANF eligibility to post-PRWORA legal permanent
residents (LPRs) after the five-year federal bar; (4) whether states grant TANF eligibility to postPRWORA asylees/refugees after the five-year bar; (5) whether states grant TANF eligibility to postPRWORA deportees after the five-year bar; (6) whether states grant TANF eligibility to postPRWORA parolees after the five-year bar; and (7) whether states grant TANF eligibility to postPRWORA battered noncitizens after the five-year bar.
We code each of the seven items as “1” if eligibilities are provided to all immigrants in that
area, 0.5 if benefits are only provided to some immigrants in that particular area, and 0 if immigrants
in that area are ineligible. We then use principle-component factor analysis to combine the seven
policy items into a factor index. All the seven policy items load positively on a single factor, with an
Eigenvalue of 3.70. The Cronbach’s Alpha scale reliability coefficient is 0.84, which passes the
conventional scale reliability threshold. The resulting factor index captures how inclusive or
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exclusive a state is toward immigrants’ access to TANF benefits, with a higher value referring to
more inclusive states and a lower value referring to more exclusive states.
Immigrant Population Density. Our second independent variable is measured by the percentage of
the foreign-born population out of the total population in each state year. Data on immigrant
population density are collected from the Census Bureau Current Population Surveys. In two
robustness checks, we gather data on immigrant voting power and immigrant network strength,
respectively, to use them as alternative measures of immigrant population density to verify our
findings.
Immigrant TANF Eligibility Score × Immigrant Population Density. In order to capture the conditional
effect of immigrant population density on the relationship between immigrant TANF eligibility
score and each of the two dependent variables, we also include a multiplicative term of the two
independent variables.
Control Variables
Socioeconomic Controls. We have included four socioeconomic control variables in our model.
The first one is the racial/ethnic diversity of the state population. Previous literature has pointed out
that racial and ethnic diversity could influence the generosity of the welfare state, and therefore it
might affect both citizens’ and immigrants’ participation in social welfare programs such as TANF
(Esses et al. 2001; Hero and Preuhs 2007). We measure racial and ethnic diversity based on the Blau
Index, calculated by the equation below, where i and t denote state and year, j denotes a particular
racial/ethnic group, and p denotes the proportion of group j in the total population (Blau 1977;
Hero 1998; Tolbert and Hero 2001). Five racial groups (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, and others)
are considered and the measure is scaled from perfect racial homogeneity (0) to perfect racial
heterogeneity (100).
5
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The second socioeconomic control variable is union density. Considering unions’ proimmigrant attitudes in recent American history and the fact that unions represent workers’ and lower
class’ interests, we argue that unions should reduce disparities between immigrants and citizens. This
variable is measured by the percentage of nonagricultural wage and salary employees who are labor
union members.
Drawing data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Surveys (CPS), we also
control for state-level unemployment and poverty rate. We argue that the unemployed and poor
both represent groups with high demands for welfare assistance, therefore they should both
influence government redistribution in general (Lowery and Berry 1983; Lewis-Beck and Rice 1985).
State Political Contexts. We have included three political contextual variables that affect states’
social welfare and immigrant policies. First, we control for mass liberalism in that voters’ liberalconservative orientation affects the overall welfare generosity and welfare eligibility toward
immigrants (Erikson et al. 1993; Hero and Preuhs 2007). We use the mass liberalism measure by
Berry et al. (1998). Second, we control for governors’ partisanship as Bartels (2008) suggests that
partisan control of political executives influences levels of inequality, and we expect Democratic
governors to decrease economic and social inequality. Last, considering that left-wing partisanship is
often connected with more generous welfare spending (Hibbs 1977; Tufte 1980; Bradley et al. 2003;
Bartels 2008), we include the percentage of Democratic state legislators and expect it to negatively
associate with the immigrant-citizen disparity.
Geographical Location. We include a dummy variable for southern states because of their
unique racial history and recent aggressive anti-immigrant law enforcement record (Key 1949; Rocha
et al. 2014). We include a dummy variable for states that share a border with Mexico and another
dummy variable for states with major ports because these states are subject to the immediacy of
immigration flows.
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FINDINGS
Table 1 reports two dynamic ECM models, both of which use ∆Immigrants’ TANF Caseload Rate as
the dependent variable. In Model (1) we only include the lagged and first-difference versions of the two key
independent variables, Immigrant TANF Eligibility and states’ Immigrant Population Density. In Model (2), we
also include two interaction terms between these two variables.
[Table 1 About Here]
In Model (1), we observe that lagged dependent variables Immigrants’ TANF Caseload Ratet-1 (b=0.090, p<0.001) has a negative and significant effect, suggesting that immigrants’ TANF usage rates
declined over time. ∆Immigrant TANF Eligibility (b=0.548, p<0.001) has a positive and significant effect on
the dependent variable, but Immigrant TANF Eligibilityt-1 does not have a significant effect. Taken together,
these results suggest that if states change their immigrant TANF policy to be more inclusive, it will
significantly promote immigrants’ TANF participation in the short run; however, it does not seem to have
a significant effect in the long run. Conversely, decreases in policy inclusiveness toward non-citizens will
follow by an immediate decline in non-citizens’ TANF participation. More specifically, a one-unit increase
in Immigrant TANF Eligibility will increase immigrants’ TANF participation by 0.548 percentage points in
the following year. These results provide support for our H1-a: exclusive immigrant TANF policies are
negatively associated with immigrants’ TANF caseload rates in the short run.
Both ∆Immigrant Population Density (b=0.322, p<0.01), and Immigrant Population Densityt-1 (b=0.046,
p<0.01) have positive and significant effects on the dependent variable, suggesting that states with either a
large or increasing immigrant population will experience an increase in immigrants’ TANF caseload rate.
More specifically, with a one-percent increase in immigrant population this year, immigrants’ TANF
caseload rate is expected to increase by 0.322 percentage points in the following year. Immigrant population
also has a long-term effect on immigrants’ TANF usage. When holding all other factors constant, a one
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percentage point increase in the immigrant population will result in an increase in immigrants’ TANF
caseload rates by 0.51 percentage points in the long run. [3]
The most interesting finding in Model (2) is that the coefficients of ∆Immigrant TANF Eligibility,
∆Immigrant Population Density, and their interaction term ∆Immigrant TANF Eligibility × ∆Immigrant Population
Density are statistically significant, meaning that the effects of changes in states’ immigrants’ eligibility
policies are conditional upon changes in immigration population, and vice versa. Substantively, this finding
suggests that changes in states’ TANF eligibility rules and changes in immigration population density
interactively influence immigrants’ TANF caseload rates, which provides support for H2-a. To facilitate the
substantive interpretation of the aforementioned interaction effects, we use the Clarify program (Tomz,
Wittenberg, and King 2003) in STATA 16 to plot how changes in states’ TANF eligibility policies and
changes in immigration jointly affect immigrants’ TANF caseload rate, when holding all other variables
constant.
Figure 1 (a) shows the effects of ∆TANF Immigrant Eligibility on ∆Immigrants’ TANF Caseload Rate
in states with increased and decreased immigrant populations.[4] We observe that for states with an
increased immigrant population, ∆TANF Immigrant Eligibility has a positive and significant effect on
∆Immigrants’ TANF Caseload Rate. In these states, when immigrant TANF eligibility rules are changed to be
more inclusive, the predicted values of ∆ Immigrant TANF Caseload Rates are positive, suggesting that states
with an increasing immigrant population and more inclusive immigrant TANF policy will witness increases
in immigrants’ TANF caseload rates. However, even in states with an increasing immigrant population, if
the state government tightens immigrant TANF eligibility rules (i.e., when X-axis, ∆TANF Immigrant
Eligibility, is negative), immigrants’ TANF caseload rate will not go up, as the predicted values of ∆ Immigrant
TANF Caseload Rates are either negative or not significantly different from zero in Figure 1(a).
The flatter line in Figure 1(a) displays the effect of ∆TANF Immigrant Eligibility on ∆Immigrants’
TANF Caseload Rate in states with a decreased immigrant population. This line shows that in states with a
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decreased immigrant population and when these states tighten their immigrant TANF eligibility rules, the
predicted values of ∆ Immigrant TANF Caseload Rates are negative. This suggests that states with a decreased
immigrant population and tightened immigrant TANF policy will witness a decrease in TANF usage
among immigrants. In states with a decreased immigrant population and loosened up immigrant TANF
policy, immigrant TANF caseload rates do not seem to change.
[Figure 1 About Here]
Because a multiplicative interaction term often indicates symmetric conditional relationships (Berry
et al., 2012), in Figure 1(b), we show the effects of ∆Immigrant Population on ∆Immigrants’ TANF Caseload
Rate in states with tightened or loosened immigrant TANF policies.[5] We see that in states with loosened
TANF immigrant policy, ∆Immigrant Population has a positive and significant effect on ∆Immigrants’ TANF
Caseload Rate. When these states experience a growing immigrant population (i.e., when X-axis, ∆Immigrant
Population, is positive), they will witness an increase in immigrants’ TANF usage. But when these states
experience a decreased immigrant population, they will witness a decrease in immigrants’ TANF caseload
rates. The flatter line indicates states with tightened TANF immigrant policy, and we find that ∆Immigrant
Population does not have a significant effect on ∆Immigrants’ TANF Caseload Rate.
Overall, both Figure 1 (a) and (b) show a significant interaction effect between state immigrant
TANF policy and state immigrant population density on immigrants’ TANF participation, lending support
for H2-a.
[Table 2 About Here]
Moving to Table 2 in which we use ∆ Citizen-immigrant TANF Caseload Gap as the dependent
variable, we present two models, with the first model without any interaction terms, and the second one
with the two interaction terms. We observe in Table 2 Model (1) that ∆Immigrant TANF Eligibility has a
negative and significant coefficient (b=-1.149, p<0.001). In other words, states that have broadened their
TANF eligibility rules and become more inclusive toward immigrants will see decreases in the citizen-
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immigrant TANF caseload gap, which supports our H1-b. Both ∆Immigrant population (b=-0.462, p<0.1)
and Immigrant populationt-1 (b=-0.098, p<0.1) have negative and significant coefficients, suggesting that states
with a larger or growing immigrant population are associated with a smaller citizen-immigrant TANF
caseload gap than those with a smaller or decreasing immigrant population. More specifically, a one-percent
increase in the state’s population is expected to close down the citizen-immigrant caseload gap by 0.462
percentage points. In a long run, a one percentage point increase in a state’s immigrant population will
result in a decrease of 0.883 percentage points in the citizen-immigrant TANF caseload gap.[6]
In Model (2) where we add the interaction terms, we notice that ∆Immigrant TANF Eligibility still
has a negative and significant coefficient (b=1.009, p<0.001). Both ∆Immigrant population and Immigrant
populationt-1 still have negative and significant coefficients. The interaction term, ∆Immigrant TANF Eligibility
× ∆Immigrant Population Density, also has a significant coefficient, suggesting that the effects of changes in
states’ TANF policies on changes in citizen-immigrant caseload gap are contingent upon changes in states’
immigrant population.
We visualize the interaction effect in Figure 2. Figure 2 (a) shows the predicted ∆Citizen-Immigrant
Caseload Gap across observed ∆Immigrant TANF Eligibility Rules in states with increased and decreased
immigrant populations. [7] We see that for states with an increased immigrant population, ∆TANF
Immigrant Policy has a negative effect on ∆Citizen-Immigrant TANF Caseload Gap, suggesting that
loosening up immigrant TANF eligibility rules can significantly reduce the citizen-immigrant caseload
gap in these states. However, in states with a decreased immigrant population, ∆TANF Immigrant
Eligibility does not have a significant effect on ∆Citizen-Immigrant TANF Caseload Gap. Taken together,
Figure 2(a) shows strong support for our H2-b, where we posit that the positive effect of exclusive
immigrant TANF policy on the immigrant-citizen TANF gap should be weakened in states with a
larger immigrant population.
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In Figure 2(b), we present the predicted citizen-immigrant caseload gap across observed
changes in the immigrant population in states with loosened and tightened TANF immigrant policy.[8]
Consistently, we observe increases in the immigrant population are associated with decreases in the
citizen-immigrant TANF caseload gap, but only so in states that loosened up their immigrant TANF
eligibility rules. In states that have tightened eligibility rules, changes in the immigrant population do
not significantly affect the citizen-immigrant caseload gap. Figure 2(b) shows consistent support for
our H2-b that the positive effect of exclusive immigrant TANF policy on the immigrant-citizen
TANF gap is weakened in states with a larger immigrant population.
[Figure 2 About Here]
Regarding the control variables, our dynamic panel models in Table 1 and Table 2 report
consistent findings. First, TANF cash benefit levels and poverty rates are both positively associated with
immigrants’ TANF caseload rates but negatively associated with the immigrant-citizen TANF gap,
suggesting that states with more generous TANF cash benefit levels and higher poverty rates will likely
witness higher TANF caseload rates by immigrants and a smaller gap in between citizens and immigrants.
In contrast, unemployment rates have a negative and significant effect on immigrants’ TANF caseload rate
but a positive and significant effect on the immigrant-citizen TANF gap, suggesting that states with higher
unemployment rates will witness lower caseload rates by immigrants and a higher citizen-immigrant gap.
This is perhaps because higher unemployment rates and harsher labor market conditions will result in
higher competition between citizens and immigrants in TANF application.

ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Replacing the dependent variable with CPS-based TANF gap
In order to verify that our results are robust, we conduct two sets of robustness checks. In
the first robustness check, we use CPS self-reported TANF participation data instead of the
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administrative data from DHHS. First, by using the CPS data, we generate a measurement of the
citizen-immigrant TANF participation gap calculated by the following equation:

TANF Gapi,t = A

Native Born Family with TANFi,t Foreign Born Family with TANFi,t
−
P × 100
Total Native Born Family
Total Foreign Born Family

[Table 3 About Here]
We use this new dependent variable to run a robustness check, and in the new model, we use
the same independent variables. The results of this robustness check are presented in Table 3 below.
As one can see from Table 3, the interaction term, ∆ Immigration Population × ∆ Immigrant TANF
Eligibility, has a significant effect on the dependent variable. To facilitate the substantive interpretation
of the interaction effects, we use the Clarify program (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003) in STATA 16 to
plot how changes in states’ TANF eligibility policies and changes in immigration jointly affect the new
citizen-immigrant TANF participation gap dependent variable. We have included the figures in
Supplementary Materials. Figure 1(a) in the Supplementary Materials shows the conditional effect of ∆
Immigration Population on the relationship between ∆ Immigrant TANF Eligibility and Δ CitizenImmigrant Gap, and Figure 1(b) in the Supplementary Materials shows the conditional effect the other
way. Overall, in states with an increased immigrant population, ∆TANF Immigrant Policy has a
negative effect on ∆Citizen-Immigrant TANF Take-up Gap, suggesting that loosening up immigrant
TANF eligibility rules can significantly reduce the citizen-immigrant TANF gap in these states.
However, in states with a decreased immigrant population, ∆TANF Immigrant Eligibility has a
positive effect on ∆Citizen-Immigrant TANF Take-up Gap, suggesting that in states with decreasing
immigrant population, loosening immigrant TANF eligibility rules does not necessarily reduce the
citizen-immigrant TANF gap, but instead could even increase the gap.
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Taken together, the first robustness check show support for our H2-b, where we posit that
the positive effect of exclusive immigrant TANF policy on the immigrant-citizen TANF
participation gap should be weakened in states with a larger immigrant population. Indeed, in states
with growing immigrant populations, a more generous TANF policy will lead to a reduction in the
gap.

Replacing immigrant population density with immigrant network and voting power
On top of the first robustness check, we further replace one of the key independent
variables, immigrant population density, with two separate measures of immigrant political power.
The first measure captures immigrant network strength and is measured by the number of
immigrant advocacy groups divided by the immigrant population based on data from the Urban
Institute National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS). The second measure captures immigrant
voting power and is measured by the percentage of registered immigrant voters out of all registered
voters based on the CPS November data. We use each of these two measures to replace the
immigrant population density variable in the main model. Below Table 4 shows the results of these
models.
As Table 4 shows, the two models convey very similar results. In both models, the
interaction term Immigrant Political Power t-1 × Immigrant Eligibility t-1 has a significant effect in
both Model 1, whether political power is measured by network strength or voting power. To
interpret the conditional effects more intuitively, we draw two figures by using Clarify with Stata 16
(Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003), and these figures are included in the Supplementary Materials
as Figure 3(a) and (b). Both figures show similar patterns: in states with a weaker immigrant network
(or voting power), a state’s immigrant TANF policy from the previous year has a negative effect on
the citizen-immigrant TANF participation gap. This suggests that in states with weaker immigrant
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political power, a more inclusive immigrant policy will help close the gap. However, in states with
stronger immigrant political power, the effect is different. Generally, states with strong immigrant
power will almost always see a reduction in the gap. However, it is when these states also see very
exclusive immigrant policy in the previous year, the reduction in the gap will be the most. This
makes sense because in states with a very inclusive immigrant policy previously, the gap is small to
begin with and there are fewer “improvements” that can be made. This result is still in line with our
argument that immigrant political power conditions the effect of immigrant TANF policy on the
citizen-immigrant TANF participation gap. We still decide to use immigrant population density in
the main model because it can serve as a proxy for both aspects of network and voting power.

CONCLUDING DISCUSSIONS
The US has had a long history of using policy devolution to exclude racial minorities and
immigrants from welfare programs. The impact of such punitive state or local policies is pervasive
and long-lasting. In this paper, we use TANF as the policy context to explore the distributive
effects of punitive state immigrant policies. We find consistent evidence that states’ immigrant
policies do have profound implications on immigrants’ participation in safety-net programs as well
as disparity in welfare usage between citizens and immigrants. While previous studies have examined
policy outcomes of restrictive federal welfare reforms (Hero and Preuhs, 2007; Condon, Filindra,
and Wichowsky, 2016), much less is known about how state-level immigrant policies shape
inequality between citizens and immigrants. This gap in the literature is unfortunate because policymaking power on immigrants’ social and economic rights largely falls on the state governments after
the 1996 welfare reform. In their systemic assessment of the American states’ immigrant welfare
eligibility policies, Hero and Preuhs (2007) call for more research on social issues regarding
immigration in American states. In her book Welfare States and Immigrant Rights, Sainsbury (2012, p2)
24

cautions that “comparative scholarship on welfare states in the last decade has continued to ignore
immigrants.” Considering the increasing immigrant population, the devolution of immigration-related
policies to states, and the heated policy debates on these issues, the paucity of research in this area is
found to be surprising (see Jeong 2013, p.1257).
Our paper speaks to Hero and Preuhs (2007) as well as Sainsbury (2016)’s call by integrating
research on subnational-level social issues regarding immigration, welfare policies, and inequality
outcomes. Examining how American states’ immigrant welfare policies influence the inequality in TANF
participation between citizens and immigrants, our analysis covers a critical time period after the 1996
federal welfare reform, when the states could freely decide upon their immigrant welfare policy. We show
that states’ policy decisions to include or exclude immigrants from their cash-assistance programs have an
important impact on immigrants’ usage of the benefits and the equity of usage between citizens and
immigrants. Our paper also shows that the relationship between state immigrant welfare policies and
inequality in welfare caseload is not monotonic. Instead, state rules regarding immigrants’ welfare eligibility
exhibit heterogeneous effects on the TANF caseload gap between citizens and immigrants in American
states, depending on the size of its immigrant population. Broadening immigrant eligibility policies is
associated with increases in immigrants’ usage of TANF and decreases in the citizen-immigrant gap, but
this effect is only seen among states with large immigrant influxes. These key findings, taken together,
suggest states are important stakeholders when it comes to inequality in welfare participation, and it
is state immigrant policies and state immigrant contexts that together influence the policy outcomes.
In this regard, our research also answers Hochschild, Chattopadhyay, Gay, and Jones-Correa’s (2013,
p10) call that scholars of immigrant incorporation should “give more attention to perceptions of
inclusion, including a sense of conditionality.”
Our study is not without limitations. First, our analysis does not reveal the size of the TANF
recipient population as the proportion of the total income-eligible population, as the DHHS
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administrative records do not report how many citizens/immigrants are income-eligible to receive
TANF in each state. Even though we can generate estimates on the size of immigrant or citizen
populations that are under the poverty line, the estimate for the immigrant group is not accurate due
to small samples [9]. As a result, we could only conduct a robustness check by using immigrant (or
citizen) TANF participants as a percentage of the total immigrant (or citizen) population, which
luckily verifies our findings. Even though our dependent variable has its limitations, we believe that
consistently comparing the citizen-immigrant TANF composition based on administrative records
data can still show us important inequality patterns that are overlooked in many previous studies on
immigrants and welfare benefit usage. Second, our data analyses primarily focus on state-level
immigrant eligibility policies and do not capture punitive policy development at the national level
during the past three years. Therefore, even though our conclusions have broad implications on how
punitive immigrant policies may influence social equity, our paper does not directly answer how
punitive national immigrant policies under the Trump administration have influenced social equity.
A natural extension of our research will be to explore immigrant and immigration policies in the
context of American federalism and to evaluate the relative influence of national- and state-level
policies on social equity.
In a recent study, Condon, Filindra, and Wichowsky (2016, p.427) find that inclusive state
immigrant TANF policy could help promote more equal education outcomes between immigrants and
citizens. Given that immigrant welfare policies have important implications on social equity in relation to
over 40 million immigrants in the United States, a natural extension of our research and that of Condon et
al. (2016) would be to explore various state- and federal-level immigrant welfare policies and their social and
political implications on social inequality in the American democracy.
In August 2019, the Trump administration announced a new rule that poor immigrants who used
or have the tendency to use public welfare programs in the future will be likely denied permanent residence
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(Shear and Sullivan, 2019). This rule, directly linking public welfare use with green card application, is an
extension of the punitive federal immigrant policy implemented in 1996. Our research suggests that
punitive state immigrant policy has a negative impact on immigrants’ participation in public welfare
programs, and this conclusion can shed light on punitive immigrant policies on the federal level. Indeed,
New York Times estimates that this new rule will likely prompt more than 324,000 noncitizens to drop out
or not enroll in public benefit programs (Shear and Sullivan, 2019). Future research is encouraged to study
the consequences of this new punitive immigrant policy at the federal level. Last but not least, considering
the most recent wave of political rhetoric targeting certain ethnic groups, such as Latinos, in the issue area
of immigration politics and policy, future research is encouraged to examine the possible heterogeneous
effects of punitive immigrant policies on different ethnic non-citizen groups.
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Table 1: Dynamic Models on Immigrants TANF Caseload Rates, 2001-2016
Model (1)

Model (2)

Δ Immigrant TANF Rate (%)

Coeff.

(SE)

Immigrants' TANF Caseload Ratet-1
∆ Immigrant TANF Eligibility
∆ Immigrant Population
∆ Immigration Population × ∆ Immigrant TANF Eligibility
Immigrant TANF Eligibility t-1
Immigrant Population t-1
Immigrant Population t-1 × Immigrant TANF Eligibility t-1
Benefits Level t-1
Diversity t-1
Union Density t-1
Unemployment t-1
Poverty t-1
Mass Liberalism t-1
% Democratic State Legislators t-1
Gubernatorial Partisanship t-1
South t-1
Port t-1
Border State t-1
Constant

-0.090***
0.548***
0.322**

(0.028)
(0.117)
(0.109)

-0.011
0.046**

(0.035)
(0.018)

0.001**
-0.006
-0.013
-0.065*
0.055**
-0.002
-0.003
-0.082
-0.188
-0.171
-0.178
-0.148

(0.000)
(0.004)
(0.014)
(0.031)
(0.018)
(0.004)
(0.003)
(0.092)
(0.149)
(0.091)
(0.216)
(0.439)

N
R-Square

782
0.1089

Significance levels: + 0.10 level, * 0.05 level, ** 0.01 level, *** 0.001 level

Δ Immigrant TANF Rate (%)

Coeff.
-0.091***
0.483***
0.298**
0.375*
-0.024
0.047**
0.003
0.001**
-0.006
-0.013
-0.065*
0.055**
-0.002
-0.003
-0.072
-0.162
-0.176*
-0.161
-0.133

(SE)
(0.027)
(0.274)
(0.111)
(0.168)
(0.063)
(0.018)
(0.011)
(0.000)
(0.005)
(0.014)
(0.031)
(0.018)

(0.004)
(0.003)
(0.093)
(0.138)
(0.088)
(0.261)
(0.446)

782
0.1129

Table 2: Dynamic Models on Citizen-Immigrant TANF Caseload Gap, 2001-2016
Model (1)

Model (2)

ΔCitizen-Immigrant Gap
Coeff.
(SE)
Citizen-Immigrant TANF Gap t-1
∆ Immigrant TANF Eligibility
∆ Immigrant Population
∆ Immigration Population × ∆ Immigrant TANF Eligibility
Immigrant TANF Eligibility t-1
Immigrant Population t-1
Immigrant Population t-1 × Immigrant TANF Eligibility t-1
Benefits Level t-1
Diversity t-1
Union Density t-1
Unemployment t-1
Poverty t-1
Mass Liberalism t-1
% Democratic State Legislators t-1
Gubernatorial Partisanship t-1
South t-1
Port t-1
Border State t-1
Constant
N
R-Square
Significance levels: + 0.10 level, * 0.05 level, ** 0.01 level, *** 0.001 level

-0.111***
-1.150***
-0.462*

(0.034)
(0.238)
(0.199)

0.006
-0.098*

(0.074)
(0.039)

-0.003**
0.009
0.014
0.177*
-0.139***
-0.002
0.009
0.251
0.352
0.238
0.368
11.863***

(0.001)
(0.009)
(0.031)
(0.072)
(0.039)
(0.007)
(0.006)
(0.191)
(0.288)
(0.180)
(0.473)
(3.644)

782
0.118

ΔCitizen-Immigrant Gap
Coeff.
(SE)
-0.112***
-1.009***
-0.410*
-0.815**
0.039
-0.099*
-0.007
-0.003**
0.009
0.013
0.175*
-0.138***
-0.002
0.011
0.228
0.322
0.248
0.329
11.948***

(0.034)
(0.225)
(0.201)
(0.315)
(0.135)
(0.039)
(0.023)
(0.001)
(0.010)
(0.031)
(0.071)
(0.040)
(0.007)
(0.006)
(0.193)
(0.271)
(0.176)
(0.573)
('3.662)

782
0.118

Table 3: Dynamic Models on Citizen-Immigrant TANF Gap (based on CPS data), 2001-2016
Model (1)
ΔCitizen-Immigrant Gap
Coeff.
(SE)
Citizen-Immigrant TANF Gap t-1
∆ Immigrant TANF Eligibility
∆ Immigrant Population
∆ Immigration Population × ∆ Immigrant TANF Eligibility
Immigrant TANF Eligibility t-1
Immigrant Population t-1
Immigrant Population t-1 × Immigrant TANF Eligibility t-1
Benefits Level t-1
Diversity t-1
Union Density t-1
Unemployment t-1
Poverty t-1
Mass Liberalism t-1
% Democratic State Legislators t-1
Gubernatorial Partisanship t-1
South t-1
Port t-1
Border State t-1
Constant

-0.772**
0.560*
0.134

(0.045)
(0.260)
(0.094)

-0.020
-0.001

(0.095)
(0.015)

-0.001

(0.001)

0.002
0.031*
-0.041
-0.027

(0.006)
(0.014)
(0.032)
(0.023)

-0.001
0.001

0.210*
0.123
0.022**
0.076
0.780*

N
827
R-Square
0.449
Significance levels: + 0.10 level, * 0.05 level, ** 0.01 level, *** 0.001 level

Model (2)
ΔCitizen-Immigrant Gap
Coeff.
(SE)

(0.005)
(0.003)

-0.797**
0.428*
0.090
-1.676**
-0.177
0.000
0.030
-0.002**
-0.001
0.032*
-0.046
-0.030
0.002

(0.042)
(0.232)
(0.086)
(0.289)
(0.133)
(0.015)
(0.016)
(0.001)
(0.006)
(0.014)
(0.030)
(0.023)
(0.005)

-0.001

(0.003)

(0.104)
(0.148)
(0.102)
(0.171)
(0.349)

0.192
0.194
0.023
0.132
0.947*

(0.099)
(0.162)
(0.098)
(0.188)
(0.374)
827
0.478
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Table 4: Dynamic Models on Immigrant Political Power, Immigrant TANF Eligibility, and CitizenImmigrant TANF Gap, 2001-2016

Citizen-Immigrant TANF Gap t-1
∆ Immigrant TANF Eligibility
∆ Immigrant Political Power (Voting or Network)
∆ Immigration Political Power × ∆ Immigrant Eligibility
Immigrant TANF Eligibility t-1
Immigrant Political Power t-1
Immigrant Political Power t-1 × Immigrant Eligibility t-1
Benefits Level t-1
Diversity t-1
Union Density t-1
Unemployment t-1
Poverty t-1
Mass Liberalism t-1
% Democratic State Legislators t-1
Gubernatorial Partisanship t-1
South t-1
Port t-1
Border State t-1
Constant

Model (1)
ΔCitizen-Immigrant Gap
(Network Model)
Coeff.
(SE)
-0.752***
(0.055)
-0.151
(0.317)
-1.465
(1.470)
12.674
(10.856)
0.177
(0.160)
-1.402**
(0.696)
0.128**
(0.064)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.003)
0.018
(0.012)
-0.073***
(0.027)
0.000
(0.021)
0.001
(0.005)
0.001
(0.004)
0.150*
(0.086)
0.297*
(0.153)
0.022**
(0.102)
-0.007
(0.149)
0.430
(0.310)

N
703
R-Square
0.434
Significance levels: + 0.10 level, * 0.05 level, ** 0.01 level, *** 0.001 level

Model (2)
ΔCitizen-Immigrant Gap
(Voting Power Model)
Coeff.
(SE)
-0.776*** (0.110)
-0.004
(0.218)
0.007
(0.021)
0.144
(0.155)
-0.172**
(0.082)
-0.018
(0.017)
0.046***
(0.015)
-0.001*** (0.000)
0.007
(0.007)
0.030**
(0.015)
-0.040
(0.036)
-0.057
(0.039)
-0.001
(0.006)
-0.001
(0.005)
0.152
(0.097)
0.243
(0.162)
-0.076
(0.085)
0.255
(0.194)
1.000***
(0.346)
784
0.426
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Figure 1: State Immigrant Policy, Immigrant Population, and Immigrant TANF Caseload
Rates
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(a) Effects of Change in Immigrant TANF Policy on Immigrant TANF Caseload Rate
in States with Increased/Decreased Immigrant Population
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(b) Effects of Change in Immigrant Population on Immigrant TANF Caseload Rates in
States with Tightened/Loosened Immigrant TANF Policies
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Figure 2: State Immigrant Policy, Immigrant Population, and Citizen-Immigrant TANF
Caseload Gap

7

(a) Effects of Change in Immigrant TANF Policy on Citizen-Immigrant TANF
Caseload Gap in States with Increased/Decreased Immigrant Population
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(b) Effects of Change in Immigrant Population on Citizen-Immigrant TANF
Caseload Gap in States with Tightened/Loosened TANF Immigrant Policies
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Endnotes
1. Meyer, Mittag, and Goerge (2018) point out that Census household surveys such as the CPS
and Survey of Income and Program Participation often rely on binary survey questions to
measure program participation status, which is prone to response errors and often
underestimate take-up rates of major welfare programs such as TANF and SNAP. Meyer
and Mittag (2019) also point out survey nonresponse (i.e., fail to respond to the entire
survey) and item nonresponse (i.e., not answering certain income and program participation
questions) as two additional sources of measurement errors in household survey data, which
might be systematically correlated with respondents’ demographic characteristics. For
example, immigrants and foreign-born individuals are more likely to avoid questions about
welfare participation and citizenship status as they may fear possible repercussions of
revealing such information. These survey errors can persist and even grow over time,
decreasing the accuracy of longitudinal estimates of participation in government transfer
programs (Meyer, Mok, and Sullivan 2015).
2. One drawback of using administrative caseload data is that the size of the eligible immigrant
population and eligible citizen population are not directly reported in the database. In the
Supplemental Materials, we report alternative measures of TANF participation rates based on CPS
self-reported TANF participation data. Alternative empirical models are estimated using this CPSbased TANF participation rates data and the results show similar evidence to support H2b. We
find that the positive effect of exclusive immigrant TANF policy on the immigrant-citizen TANF
participation gap should be weakened in states with a larger immigrant population. Indeed, in states
with growing immigrant populations, a more generous TANF immigrant policy will lead to a
reduction in the gap.
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3. Following De Boef and Keele (2008), the long-term effect= -0.046/(-0.090)=0.51, which is
reflected by the coefficients of Immigrant Population Densityt-1 (b=0.046, p<0.01) and Immigrants’
TANF Caseload Ratet-1 (b= -0.090, p<0.001).
4. Our ∆ Immigrant population density variable ranges from -27.558 to 18.192. In Figure 1(a), we
choose the 25th percentile value for this variable (i.e., -0.779) to represent “states with a
decreased immigrant population,” and 75th percentile value for this variable (i.e., 0.792) to
represent “states with an increased immigrant population.” However, Figure 1(b) uses the
full range of ∆ Immigrant population density: (-27.5, 18.2). Because these two values (-0.779 and
0.792) picked to draw Figure 1 (a) are quite far away from the minimum (-27.5) and
maximum (18.2) value of the full range of the variable used in Figure 1 (b), Figure 1(a) and
Figure 1(b) generated quite different predicted values of the dependent variable. This
explains why Figure 1(a) and Figure 1(b) have quite different ranges for the Y-axis.
5. Our first-difference immigrant TANF eligibility variable has a range from -2.637 to 3.111.
Ideally, we’d like to take the 25th and 75th percentile values of this variable to represent
states with tightened policy and states with loosened policy. However, the vast majority of
state years (about 86% of state years) experienced no change in their TANF policies.
Therefore, we choose -0.869 (1st percentile) to represent states that tightened their
immigrant TANF policy, and from our observation, the following states fit this category:
North Dakota (2004), South Carolina, Ohio, Montana (2002), Idaho (2000), Mississippi
(2015), Alabama, New Mexico, and Colorado. We choose 1.222 (99th percentile) as states
that loosened their immigrant TANF policy, and our data collection shows that the
following states fit this category: Kansas, Wyoming, Georgia, North Dakota (2012), Nevada,
Delaware, Montana (2000 and 2009), Mississippi (2014), Arkansas, Idaho (2010), Rhode
Island.

35

6. Following De Boef and Keele (2008), the long-term effect= -(-0.098)/(-0.111)=-0.883,
which is reflected by the coefficients of Immigrant Population Densityt-1 (b=-0.098, p<0.05) and
Citizen-Immigrant TANF Caseload Gap t-1 (b=-0.111, p<0.001).
7. For Figure 2(a), we choose the 25th percentile value (i.e., -0.779) of the ∆Immigrant Population
variable to represent “states with a decreased immigrant population,” and the 75th percentile
value (i.e., 0.792) for this variable to represent “states with an increased immigrant
population.” Because these two values are quite far away from the lower (-27.5) and upper
(18.2) end of the range of the variable, and Figure 2(b) considers a full range of the
∆Immigrant Population variable, Figure 2(a) and Figure 2(b)ended up having quite different
predicted values for the Y-axis.
8. Our first-difference immigrant TANF eligibility variable has a range from -2.637 to 3.111.
Ideally, we’d like to use the 25th and 75th percentile values of this variable to represent states
with tightened policy and states with loosened policy. However, the vast majority of state
years (about 86% of state years) experienced no change in their TANF policies. Therefore,
we choose -0.869 (1st percentile) to represent states that tightened their immigrant TANF
policy, and from our observation, and1.222 (99th percentile) to represent states that loosened
their immigrant TANF policy. There are a number of state years that fit each of these two
categories.
9. When disaggregated to state years, the estimated noncitizen population under poverty had
many 0 or extremely small observations. For example, out of the 800 state-year observations,
58.13% or 465 state years had less than 40 noncitizens under poverty. This makes using
“noncitizens under poverty group” as a baseline extremely unreliable.
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